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Abstract: This paper uses event history analysis to test the significance of
several macro-economic and bank-specific variables in explaining bank fail-
ures during the Venezuelan banking crisis of the mid-1990s. Poor bank
profitability, proxied by a low net interest margin, and low GDP growth
are found significant in increasing the probability of bank failure. Other
useful indicators, for some model specifications, are the share of non-
performing loans and that of non productive assets to banks’ own funds,
which raise the likelihood of crisis. A large amount of bank liquid assets,
in turn, reduces the likelihood of failure for some model specifications.
The opposite is true for high real deposit rates. Although it could be inter-
preted, at first sight, as a too restrictive monetary policy, this is not sup-
ported by the lack of significance of the real lending rate and, even more
so, real money growth, a more direct indicator of the monetary policy
stance.
Keywords: Venezuela, banking crisis, early indicators.
Resumen: Este trabajo utiliza un análisis de historia de eventos para eva-
luar empíricamente qué variables macroeconómicas y bancarias pueden
explicar las quiebras bancarias que se produjeron durante la crisis de la
segunda mitad de la década de 1990 en Venezuela. Una baja rentabilidad,
medida por el margen financiero neto, y el escaso crecimiento económico
resultan significativos en aumentar la probabilidad de quiebra bancaria.
Otros indicadores útiles, para algunas especificaciones del modelo, son el
porcentaje de activos impagados y el de activos improductivos respecto a
los recursos propios, que aumentan la probabilidad de crisis. Por el con-
trario, una proporción elevada de activos líquidos reduce la probabilidad
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de quiebra en algunos casos, mientras que tipos de interés altos sobre de-
pósitos la aumentan. Aunque este último resultado podría hacer pensar
que la política monetaria en Venezuela fue excesivamente restrictiva an-
tes de la crisis, no existe evidencia que lo confirme en el caso de otras
variables clave como los tipos de interés reales sobre préstamos y, más
aún, el crecimiento de la masa monetaria en términos reales.
Palabras clave: Venezuela, crisis bancarias, indicadores adelantados.
Introduction
ecurrent events of banking crises around the world have gener-
ated an extensive literature from causation to prevention. How-
ever, there is still no consensus on which are the main determinants
of bank failure, so that an early warning systems constructed to pre-
vent such failures, or at least minimize their impact. This explains the
efforts made by the International Monetary Fund and national author-
ities from different countries to identify a set of financial soundness
indicators to be used as a surveillance tool of potential crises (Sunda-
rarajan et al., 2002). However, the validity of a specific set of indicators
is still not firmly confirmed by empirical analysis, particularly for
emerging countries.
In the mid-90s, Venezuela experienced a systemic banking crisis,
with a large amount of bank failures and a fiscal cost estimated at
17% of the GDP. Notwithstanding the severity of the crisis, there is no
empirical analysis of the determinants of these bank failures. Such
analysis could contribute to building early indicators of bank unsound-
ness for the Venezuelan banking system, particularly if they do not
require much calculation and can be easily tracked.
The most obvious indicators, and also those analyzed first in the
literature, are bank specific variables from bank balance sheets or
financial statements. More recently, macroeconomic indicators have
received large attention, especially in the case of emerging countries.
This is because macroeconomic imbalances are generally larger and
more frequent in these countries and also tend to have bigger conse-
quences, financial systems being shallower. However, macroeconomic
variables alone can hardly explain the failure of a particular institu-
tion, which limits policy conclusions to the aggregate level. It seems
important, therefore, to include both bank-specific and macroeconomic
variables as potential determinants of banking crisis.
Reconomía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 73
This paper uses event history analysis to test the significance of
several macro-financial and bank-specific variables in explaining bank
failures during the Venezuelan banking crisis of the mid-1990s. Of
special interest is the role of monetary policy since several observers
have argued that a too restrictive monetary policy stance was at the
origin of the Venezuelan crisis. Although data availability is an issue,
which constraints the robustness and generality of the results, poor
bank profitability and low GDP growth are found significant in increas-
ing the likelihood of bank failure. In addition, bank solvency, asset
quality and liquidity indicators are significant in some bi-variate and
three-variate model specifications. The same is true for high real de-
posit rates, which, however, do not seem to be related with the mon-
etary policy stance as will be explained.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section I reviews the main
early warning indicators of bank failures, found in the literature, and
the different methodologies used. Section II describes the origin and
developments of the Venezuelan banking crisis. Section III sets out
the paper’s objective. Section IV explains the methodology used. Sec-
tion V describes the variables included and the expected results. Section
VI reports the results and Section VII draws some conclusions and
possible extensions to the paper.
I. A Review of the Literature
The empirical research on the determinants of bank failures started
as early as the 1970s and concentrated on bank-specific variables.
This strand of the literature, but also future ones, is generally non-
structural since its main focus is finding “early warning indicators” of
bank insolvency or failure on the basis of the available data. Most
indicators are drawn from bank balance sheets and income statements
and very few (and virtually only for the US) are market-based. The
latter are based on the assumption that all available information rel-
evant to the financial health of a bank is reflected in bank asset prices,
generally equity and/or debt prices.
In the 1990s, the large number of crisis in emerging countries,
associated in many instances with macroeconomic instability, drew
researchers’ attention to macroeconomic variables. Most studies fo-
cused on systemic banking crises rather than individual bank fail-
ures so conclusions are hard to draw for individual bank failures. There74 García Herrero: Determinants of the Venezuelan Banking Crisis
are a number of studies, though, which deal with bank failures ex-
ploring the relevance of macroeconomic and bank-bank specific fac-
tors (Whalen, 1991; Cole and Ghunter, 1995; González-Hermosillo et
al., 1996; González-Hermosillo, 1999; and Arreaza et al., 2002). In ad-
dition, most of the studies have been applied to US banks and only a
few to emerging countries. In particular, there is one study for Ven-
ezuela, which focuses on bank unsoundness during the most recent
period but not during the mid-1990s banking crisis (Arreaza et al.,
2002). Tables 1 and 2 summarize the main findings of the literature.
The first lists the empirical studies using only bank-specific variables
together. The second shows those with macroeconomic variables or
both together.
The methodologies used have also evolved over time. In the early
1970s, the main tool was discriminant analysis based on banking in-
dicators (Sinkey, 1975, and Altman, 1977, among others). These are a
priori undefined models, which simply discriminate between problem
and non-problem institutions rather than estimating the probability
of failure on the basis of certain independent variables. To this end, a
linear or quadratic discriminant function is estimated, which maxi-
mizes the difference between the two groups. Starting in 1977, ex post
empirical models, mainly binary ones, are employed to estimate the
probability of failure conditional on certain bank-specific variables
(Martin, 1977). The main difference between the two is that the former
is a mere classification technique while the latter analyzes a causal
relationship. The same technique has been used in the 1990s to test
the relevance of macroeconomic variables in explaining banking crises.
More recently, survival models have been applied to explaining
bank failures. Most of the studies are parametric and continuous, based
on proportional hazard functions. The most widely used is the Cox
proportional hazard function because it partially avoids the strong
distributional assumptions associated with parametric survival mod-
els (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). One of the caveats of these models,
though, is that coefficients are kept stable, while there is evidence
that they are not (Hooks 1995). Another important weakness of this
methodology is that the difference between the determinants of bank
failure and the factors affecting the timing of bank failure cannot be
separated since it is implicitly assumed that all banks will ultimately
fail. This is why some authors separate the factors influencing the
likelihood of bank failure –allowing for a probability of failure below
one– from those that condition the timing of failure (Cole and Gunther,
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Regardless of the method of estimation, the variables which are
found significant across different studies are rather similar. This is
particularly interesting if one takes into account that the definition of
bank failure varies widely in the literature. In general, no distinction
is made between insolvency and failure (Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989a). Some
authors encompass both concepts in relatively objective definitions,
such as book-value insolvency (when the book value of a bank’s assets
is less than the book value of its liabilities) or market-value insol-
vency (when the market value of a bank’s assets is less than the value
of its liabilities net of the value of insurance guarantees) or the con-
cession of financial support by the central bank to a given institution
(González-Hermosillo et al., 1996). Others use more subjective defini-
tions, such as official insolvency (i.e., when capital is judged inad-
equate by the regulators and the institution is closed or merged), or
de facto failure (when a bank ceases to conduct autonomous opera-
tions induced by the regulator). A few authors separate insolvency
from failure, considering the latter a regulator-determined event
(Gajewski, 1988, and Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989b).
There are a few core factors which are generally found significant
in affecting the likelihood of failure, not only for US samples but also
for other countries. These are measures of capital adequacy (e.g., capi-
tal to total loans or assets, or capital to risk-adjusted assets), asset
quality (e.g., non performing loans or loan loss reserves to total loans
or assets) and profitability indicators (e.g., net or gross income or earn-
ings to total assets or capital). However, early indicators of capital
adequacy have sometimes a counterintuitive sign, indicating an in-
crease in the probability of bank failure when capital adequacy is high
(Logan, 2001, and Arreaza et al., 2002). Management quality and li-
quidity measures are significant in fewer studies. The relatively weaker
significance of management quality is probably related to the diffi-
culty in proxing it. Some recent studies have made large strides in
finding management-related early indicators of bank failures but they
are very difficult to apply for countries where data is poorer or scarce
(Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). As for liquidity, some studies do not test
liquidity indicators under the assumption that liquidity problems are
symptoms of a crisis rather than the cause of it (Berg and Hexeberg,
1994).
The evidence for market-based indicators (e.g., return on bank
stocks but also option pricing techniques and subordinated debt) is
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Pettway and Sinkey (1980) and Shick and Sherman (1980) show that
problem banks experienced unexpectedly low stock market returns
before being classified as problem banks by the regulators. However,
Simons and Cross (1991) find no such evidence. In the same vein,
Randall (1989) argues against the usefulness of both bank stock prices
and ratings as early-warning signals of bank problems.
Finally, a number of macroeconomic variables are generally found
significant in aggregate empirical studies of banking crises. This is
the case of low economic growth and high interest rates, which appear to
anticipate banking crises (Hardy and Pazarbasioglu, 1998; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1997), as well as adverse trade shocks, real
exchange rate appreciation and banks’ large foreign liabilities. The
first two variables, and particularly high real interest rates, are also
robust in bank-to-bank estimations (González-Hermosillo et al., 1996;
González-Hermosillo, 1999; and Arreaza et al., 2002). Rapid growth in
bank credit to the private sector appears to increase the likelihood of bank-
ing crises in macroeconomic studies, but the evidence is not supported
by micro-studies with bank-specific variables. As example of the lat-
ter is Logan (2001), who finds the opposite result for UK banks.
II. The Venezuelan Banking Crisis
Prior to the adoption of a bold program of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion and financial liberalization in 1989, the Venezuelan banking sys-
tem was composed of a large number of privately-owned, specialized
banks belonging to a few financial groups. These were undercapital-
ized and remained, to a large extent, outside the control of the super-
visory authority (SUNDEBAN). A number of banks failed during this
period but the government bailed them all out. The 1989 economic
program, which included the opening up of the Venezuelan banking
system to foreign competition, was not fully introduced. While restric-
tions on interest rates and foreign currency transactions were abol-
ished and the Bolivar was allowed to float, measures to increase com-
petition in the financial sector were held back by Congress. This meant
that the structure of the financial system remained virtually unchan-
ged until the crisis erupted, with foreign-banks holding less than 1%
of total assets and state-owned banks holding no more than 10%. The
oligopolistic structure of the Venezuelan financial system constrained
the power of the supervisory authority, particularly as regards the
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accuracy of the data that banks reported. In addition, because of the
absence of consolidated supervision, financial groups had all the in-
centives to divert problem loans and losses to their affiliates, particu-
larly those off-shore. Finally, the lack of competition allowed for an
excessive cost structure and low efficiency within the banking system.
The early part of the 1990s was characterized by fast growth, largely
driven by a rapid expansion in the non-oil sector. However, the gov-
ernment fiscal position deteriorated significantly. Two attempted mili-
tary coups during 1992 heightened the uncertainty about the country’s
political and economic stability. During this period monetary policy
switched from a tight stance to a lax one, avoiding increases in inter-
est rates. There were several runs on the Bolivar, which depreciated
sharply.
The fast economic expansion came to a halt in 1993 and real GDP
fell by 0.1% that year. The budget deficit further deteriorated. Politi-
cal uncertainty persisted as Congress removed President Pérez from
office, on charges of misuse of funds. Inflation accelerated and eco-
nomic activity further slowed down and contracted by about 4.7% in
the first quarter of 1994.
Despite financial liberalization and the high economic growth dur-
ing 1991-92, the stock of commercial bank credit declined from an
average of about 22% of GDP in the period from 1989 to 1992 to 16%
in 1992. The worsening of the economic conditions and political un-
certainty contributed to the sharp reduction in bank credit. At the
same time, non-performing loans rose sharply from 1991 to 1992.
In October 1993, a new financial legislation was approved, aimed
at increasing competition in the banking sector and strengthening
supervision. This legislation permitted multipurpose banking and
established stricter capital requirements for banks and other finan-
cial institutions shortly after, and despite the spirit of the new financial
legislation, a banking crisis broke out against a background of macro-
economic imbalances and political uncertainty.
The crisis was triggered by the collapse of Banco Latino in mid-
January 1994, the second largest bank in terms of deposits.1 From the
last quarter of 1993, when rumors spread about its distressed finan-
cial situation, Banco Latino had to meet major deposit withdrawals
through large scale asset sales and borrowing from the Central Bank
of Venezuela (CBV). These withdrawals became unsustainable by end-
1 The next paragraphs describing the crisis developments are drawn from García Herrero
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1993 when they reached twice the amount of the bank’s capital. Con-
sequently, Banco Latino and its related institutions were closed.
Through the closure, the group’s financial liabilities were frozen, af-
fecting over 10% of total commercial banks’ deposits, including a large
share of trust funds, pension funds, government deposits and inter-
bank deposits. Among the reasons which contributed to Bank Latino’s
failure, reportedly the most important ones were inappropriate lend-
ing practices, which allowed collateral to be used for multiple loans,
poor loan quality, and a high concentration in real state loans.
The uncertainty created by the freezing of Banco Latino’s deposits
led to deposit runs in two banks, which belonged to the same financial
group. Soon thereafter, deposit runs started in other banks perceived
by the public as financially weak.2 There were also runs from the trad-
ing desks and offshore operations of these banks, especially after it
became known that there were large amounts of hidden off-balance
sheet deposits with virtually no asset coverage. At the same time, other
institutions perceived as sound managed to maintain the deposit base
and even to attract deposits but practically did not lend their extra-
funds in the interbank market. The Deposit Guarantee Fund (FOGADE)
reacted to the deposit runs by offering financial assistance on a large
scale. By February 1994, FOGADE had depleted its own resources and
had to start receiving funds from the CBV in order to continue provid-
ing loans to distressed institutions. The CBV did not manage to steril-
ize these large injections fully and inflation continued to creep up.
Despite the authorities’ efforts to restore confidence in the bank-
ing system, which included reopening Banco Latino as a state-owned
bank,3 market expectations worsened. This was due, at least in part,
by the uncertainty surrounding the new government’s economic poli-
cies, and more specifically the widespread fears of exchange controls,
devaluation and partial freezing of bank deposits. By end-March 1994,
seven banks and a financial company, with a share of about 21% of
total deposits, had been virtually excluded from the overnight inter-
bank market. The eight institutions were closed in June 1994.
During the weeks following their closure, money demand fell
sharply and there was widespread capital flight leading to a large
loss in reserves. In early July, the government decided to fix the ex-
change rate against the dollar and to impose strict exchange rate con-
trols. These measures slowed down the fall in the deposit base for
2 This group of weak banks accounted for over 30% of total banking system deposits.
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some weeks but, in July and August, rumors about the financial situ-
ation of two large banks, Banco Consolidado and Venezuela, led to
deposit runs again. FOGADE’s precarious financial situation made ad-
ditional liquidity injections unfeasible so the government decided to
nationalize these banks. By then, the failed banks (either national-
ized or closed) were nearly 50% of total bank deposits, and roughly
the same share of total assets.4
In December 1994, it became clear that two other banks, Banco
Progreso and República, were not viable since they had not managed
to improve their financial situation notwithstanding the massive fi-
nancial assistance received from FOGADE. The authorities decided to
close Banco Progreso because of the very large irregular operations in
its balance sheets. In turn, Banco República, with a more stable and
regular deposit base, was nationalized. Shortly after, in January 1995,
three other banks, which found themselves in the same situation as
Banco Progreso, had to be closed. By then, the economy was in deep
recession (GDP fell 5% in real terms in 1994), only supported by the oil
sector. The weakness of the economy avoided a further surge in infla-
tion, notwithstanding the large liquidity injections made by the CBV.
Finally, in August 1995, a small private bank was intervened. Since
then, and in large part, due to the positive impact of the large devalu-
ations of December 1995 and April 1996, after capital controls were
lifted, no more banks failed. The foreign exchange profits and the re-
covery of the economy helped banks improve their prudential ratios,
including solvency. However, inflation also rose further.
In sum, the Venezuelan banking crisis acquired a large dimension
and had a huge cost both in economic and fiscal terms. Reportedly, the
main factors behind the crisis were macroeconomic and bank-specific
ones. Among the first, fiscal imbalances were large and growing and
economic growth had fallen sharply in the run up to the crisis. Among
the bank-specific factors, poor management and loan quality are gen-
erally considered (García Herrero, 1997a, and De Krivoy, 2000).
III. Paper Objective
This paper tests the relevance of bank-specific and macro-financial
variables as determinants of bank failures during the Venezuelan cri-
sis of the mid-1990s.
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Bank-specific and macro-financial variables may affect the prob-
ability of bank failure since they influence liquidity, market and credit
risks. Liquidity risk, in the context of bank failures, is linked to the
possibility that customers withdraw their deposits in large amounts,
while the assets are not liquid and/or the interbank market or the
central bank does not provide with enough liquidity to banks in need.
Market risk is related to changes in market conditions, which affect
the value of assets. Credit risk is related to the impossibility, or un-
willingness, of debtors to repay their debts. The degree of exposure to
these risks that individual banks decide to assume depends on their
risk preferences, strategies and regulatory guidelines. The bank-spe-
cific and macroeconomic indicators to be introduced in this empirical
analysis should constitute an appropriate summary of these prefer-
ences and strategies.
Bank specific indicators are obviously important for explaining
bank failures but have several caveats, particularly in emerging coun-
tries. Those drawn from bank balance sheets and financial statements
are less reliable than in industrial countries because of the relatively
poor quality of accounting rules and regulation and supervision. In
addition, market-based indicators are bound to be useless if markets
are not liquid (or do not exist) for bank stocks, subordinated debt or
other market instruments. All in all, indicators from bank balance
sheets and financial statements seem a better choice for a country,
such as Venezuela, where most banks are not quoted and those stocks
quoted are illiquid.
To ensure coverage of the most important aspects, the choice of
indicators is structured on the basis of the CAMEL5 system, tradition-
ally used by US regulators as an early warning tool and often em-
ployed in the literature. The CAMEL has five components: capital ad-
equacy, asset quality, management quality, profitability and liquidity.
Capital adequacy is a measure of an institution’s buffer against
future unanticipated losses. Asset quality generally refers to loan qual-
ity, based on the probability of repayment, and is directly related to
credit risk. Management quality is key in determining the approach
of a bank to risk. However, it is a very subjective indicator for which
information is not readily available. Typically, measures of efficiency
are used as a proxy of bank management but it is acknowledged to
reflect only one of the several dimensions of management quality and,
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in some cases, could be swamped by macroeconomic factors. Liquidity
indicators are key to assess an institution’s ability to meet unantici-
pated withdrawals of deposits.
Macro-financial variables may be relevant in emerging countries,
due to their large volatility. A clear example is a sharp reduction in
economic growth, which tends to increase credit risk. Too high inter-
est rates should also raise credit risk although they could be benefi-
cial for banks’ profitability as long as they imply large interest rate
spreads. The monetary policy stance is another key factor. In prin-
ciple, a laxer monetary policy should reduce liquidity risk but, if main-
tained too long, it may raise market and credit risks through a surge
in inflation.
IV. Methodology
This paper uses discrete event history analysis to test empirically
which are the most relevant early warning indicators of bank failure
for the Venezuelan banking crisis of the mid-1990s. Until recently,
history event analysis was mainly used in social sciences to study trans-
itions across a set of discrete states (Allison, 1982; Allison, 1984; Kiefer,
1988; Yamaguchi, 1991; and Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995). However,
economists have started to apply it as a useful tool for causal analysis
because it fits the discrete nature of the available data (quarterly). This
implies that bank failures at the beginning and at the end of the quarter
cannot be differentiated in this dataset. In addition, this methodology
is particularly useful for small datasets, such as this one, because
they do not necessarily require any assumption about the distribu-
tion process and the computation is simple. Another advantage is that
time-varying explanatory variables are easily incorporated in this type
of event history analysis (Allison, 1982).
Among the existing techniques of event history analysis, the one
chosen in this paper is for non-repeated events of a single kind. It is of
a single kind, because of the definition of bank failure chosen. A bank
is considered failed when the government or the central bank inter-
venes, closes or nationalizes a bank, whatever happens first. In other
words, the type of action is not relevant in determining whether a bank
fails. This rather open definition of failure suits the Venezuelan crisis
well since ailing banks were treated differently depending on when they
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In addition, such definition avoids differentiating between insolvency
and failure as government action is in this case synonymous of bank
insolvency. Finally, bank failures are considered non-repeated events
and, as such, they disappear from the sample after the first govern-
ment action, be it intervention, nationalization or closure (or after
they “fail” on the basis of the above described definition). In reality,
during the Venezuelan crisis some of the banks were closed first and
then nationalized, or closed and then intervened. These are not consi-
dered to have failed twice but only once. The implicit assumption here is
that banks were insolvent at the time of the first government action.
Given how the crisis developed (see Section II), it seems quite a safe
assumption.
Moving to briefly describing the methodology, it is assumed that
time can take on only positive integer values (t = 1, 2, 3, …) and that we
observe a total of n independent individuals (i = 1, …, n), beginning at
a starting point t = 1.6 The risk set is the number of individuals who
are at risk of event occurrence at each point in time. In this case, the
risk set is the number of banks subject to failure at each time.
Every observation continues until time ti, at which point either an
event occurs or the observation is censored. As usual, it is assumed
that the time of censoring is independent of the hazard rate. The vari-
able di is set equal to 1 if i is uncensored; otherwise it is zero. Also
observed is a K × I vector of explanatory variables xit, which may take
on different values at different discrete times. The discrete-time haz-
ard rate (Pit) is defined as the estimated probability that a bank fails
at time t from the banks that are still at risk.
Pit = Pr[Ti = t | Ti $ t, xit] (1)
Where T is the discrete random variable giving the uncensored
time of event occurrence. In this paper, the hazard rate is the esti-
mated probability of a bank failure within a particular quarter for
those banks that have not yet failed. While the hazard rate is an un-
observed variable, it controls both the occurrence and the timing of
events. As such, it is the fundamental dependent variable in event
history analysis.
Among the discrete techniques of event history analysis, life tables
are chosen to calculate the hazard rate rather than Kaplan-Meier (or
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product limit) estimates. Life tables need less computing and are usu-
ally applied to a small number of observations. Furthermore, their
potential disadvantage, the subjective choice of discrete time inter-
vals, is not relevant for this sample because the intervals are deter-
mined by the quarterly nature of the data and no other choice exists.
Life tables, thus, facilitate the calculation of non-parametric estimates
of the survivor function, the density function and the transition rate,
given a set of episodes (i.e., bank failures). In our specific case, the
estimate of the hazard rate in each quarter is calculated dividing
the number of events (failures) by the number of banks at risk.
The most popular distribution to specify how this hazard rate de-
pends on time and the explanatory variables is the logistic regression
function. This is a binary distribution in which yit = 1 if a bank fails
(on the basis of the definition given above) and yit = 0 if a bank does not
fail. Then:
Pit = 1 – exp (–at – b9 xit)/(1 + exp (–at –b9 xit)) if yit = 1 (2)
or
1 – Pit = 1/[1 + exp (–at –b9 xit)] if yit = 0 (3)
The ratio of (2) over (3) is the odds ratio in favour of a bank failure.
Taking natural logs of this ratio, we obtain:
Log[Pit/(1 – Pit)] = at + b9 xit (4)
Although the choice of the logistic regression model is somewhat
arbitrary, it does have a number of advantages. First, it constrains Pit
to lie between zero and one for any values of b and xit. Second, it is
computationally simple and statistics are readably available. Third,
it has been proven that the estimates of b obtained with this discrete
model are also those of the underlying continuous model (Prentice and
Gloecker, 1978). The significance of the b coefficients shows whether
the regressors explain the likelihood of bank failure, i.e., the hazard
rate. The estimation is carried out by Maximum Likelihood.
Regressors include bank-specific and macro-financial variables. The
former vary through individual bank and time and the latter only
through time. In addition, regressors are lagged to limit endogeneity
problems. Since data were not reported to the Superintendency in the
case of some of the failing banks close to the failure, two lags (i.e., twoeconomía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 87
quarters) are taken for all regressors for all banks.7 This seems like a
reasonable timeframe for macroeconomic variables to avoid endo-
geneity. 8
This modifies equation (4) in the following way:
Log[Pit/(1 – Pit)] = at + b9 S Xit – 2 + m9 S Zt – 2 (5)
where Xit are the bank specific variables and Zt are the macro-finan-
cial ones. Quarterly time dummies are not included in the baseline
exercise because macroeconomic variables already pick up most of
the time variation in the sample.9
Finally, it is important to note that this methodology treats all
observations (for each bank in each t) as independent observations.
This implies that the possibility of contagion from one bank to an-
other cannot be analyzed with this methodology. While this is a gen-
eral weakness, the Venezuelan crisis is one where contagion was not a
big issue since failing banks were insolvent although public data did
not show it clearly.
V. Variables Included and Expected Results
On the basis of the description of events in Section II, this empirical
investigation of the Venezuelan banking crisis of the mid 1990s starts
several months before the crisis (before economic growth came to a
halt) and ends when there were no clear risks of additional bank fail-
ures. The sample, thus, starts in the second quarter of 1992 and ends
in the second quarter of 1996. It would have been interesting to start
even before 1992, not only to increase the number of observations, but
also to include other bank failures prior to the crisis of the mid-1990s.
Unfortunately bank-specific data is not readably available.
In the above described sample, the number of banks was 44 at the
start and dropped to 26 by the end of the period considered. Since no
bank closed as a consequence of a business decision (i.e., granting the
7 The small number of observations also limits the number of additional lags that can be
taken.
8 Only one lag is taken for macroeconomic variables as a robustness test and results do not
change.
9 A robustness test was conducted to ensure that the significance of bank-specific variables
does not change depending on whether time dummies are taking instead of macroeconomic
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full payment of bank liabilities), it is easy to infer that 18 banks failed
during that period. This implies that the sample has a maximum of
519 observations.
The dependent variable (called FAIL) is a binary variable, which
takes the value of one when the individual bank fails and zero other-
wise, as described in the previous methodological section. The infor-
mation on bank failure, as previously defined, is compiled from re-
ports from the CBV and SUNDEBAN.
Bank-specific variables are financial ratios of individual banks from
banks’ balance sheets and income statements, available in the quar-
terly bulletins of SUNDEBAN. Market indicators are not included be-
cause they would not be relevant in the Venezuelan case. In fact, most
banks belonged to private individuals and were not quoted. Further-
more, the few bank stocks which were quoted were illiquid, clearly
limiting the information content of stock prices.
The bank-specific indicators chosen reflect the five components of
the CAMEL rating (exact definitions and sources can be found in Ap-
pendix 1). The first, capital adequacy, is proxied by four different indi-
cators: i) the share of own funds (capital and reserves) to total assets
(CAPITAL), which should reduce the likelihood of bank failure and, thus,
have a negative prior (the prior of each variable can be found in Table 3;
ii) the share of productive assets to total assets (PRODUCTIVE ASSETS).
Productive assets are understood as those generating a flow of finan-
cial revenues, such as loans and government paper but not real state
or NPLs. This variable also has a negative prior; iii) the share of non-
productive assets to own funds (NON PRODUCTIVE ASSETS), with a posi-
tive prior; and iv) other assets to own funds (OTHER ASSETS), which
includes the most illiquid assets, mainly real state. It also has a posi-
tive prior.
The second is asset quality, proxied by three indicators: i) the ratio
of non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs/LOANS); ii) the ratio of
non-performing loans to own funds (NPLs/CAPITAL); iii) and the share
of provisioned loans over gross NPLs. The prior of the first two is clearly
positive since they should reflect poor asset quality. The third is harder
to interpret. A large mount of provisioned loans should reflect a prudent
behavior on the part of banks. However, large provisions may also
indicate that the bank is undergoing a difficult situation. In addition,
provisioning reduces banks’ profitability.
The third is management competence, which is also the hardest to
proxy. Most studies use indicators of bank efficiency, but it should beeconomía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 89
acknowledged that they only reflect an angle of management compe-
tence and could be swamped by macroeconomic factors. Based on data
availability to indicators of the degree of bank inefficiency are chosen:
i) the share of expenses related to the normal business (STRUCTURAL
EXPENSES), which included financial and administrative expenses, as
well as headcount, all as a percentage of average assets; ii) the share
of financial and administrative expenses to the average cost of fund-
ing (OPERATIONAL EXPENSES). This excludes headcount expenses. The
higher these proxies the lower management competence, which im-
plies a positive prior of both ratios in explaining bank failure.
The fourth is earnings (also known as profitability). There are two
main indicators of earnings in the SUNDEBAN statistics: i) the net in-
terest margin, or the difference between financial revenues to finan-
cial expenses as a percentage of total assets (NET INTEREST MARGIN);
and ii) inverse of financial expenses to the average cost of funding
(FINANCIAL EXPENSES). The higher these indicators, the more profit-
able a bank will be, which should reduce the likelihood of bank failure
since earnings can be used as a buffer to respond to potential losses.
The fifth CAMEL indicator is liquidity adequacy, measured by the
amount of very liquid assets, in domestic and foreign currency, to total
deposits (VERY LIQUID ASSETS). Very liquid assets include cash in do-
mestic and foreign currency and short-term central bank or govern-
ment bills in domestic or foreign currency. The higher this ratio, the
lower the probability of bank failure since bank liquidity either re-
flects bank soundness or, at least, helps mask solvency problems for
longer than if a bank were illiquid.
The macro-financial variables included follow the existing litera-
ture (definitions and data sources can be found in Appendix 1). The
first is real GDP growth (REALGDP), with an expected negative sign as
high growth should reduce the likelihood of bank failure (see Table 3
for a list of variables and expected signs). The second is the growth in
real broad money (REALM2), proxing the stance of monetary policy. A
laxer policy stance should help banks with their liquidity problems,
at least in the short run. This is why the expected sign is negative, as
for the bank-specific indicator of liquidity. However, a lax monetary
policy will generally lead to inflation in the future, which may be det-
rimental for the soundness of the financial system. This longer-term
effect could be picked up in the inflation variable (see below). The
third and fourth variables are real interest rates on bank loans and on
bank deposits (REAL DEPOSITE RATE AND REAL LENDING RATE). These90 García Herrero: Determinants of the Venezuelan Banking Crisis
should increase the likelihood of bank failure in as far as they contrib-
ute to lower economic growth and indirectly higher non-performing
loans. However, two low real deposit rates may discourage the public
from placing their savings in the banking system. In addition both
variables may also reflect the monetary policy stance if the transmis-
sion mechanism works appropriately. The fifth variable, banks’ inter-
est rate spread (SPREAD), picks up the difference between the real
deposit rate and the real lending rate. The spread should in principle
lower the likelihood of bank failure since it is one of the main sources
of bank profitability. However, the maintenance of very large spreads
may discourage disintermediation in the long run. Sixth, a frequently
Table 3. Expected Signs for Each Variable
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Financial expenses +
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Real lending rate +
Real deposit rate +
Interest rate spread –
Current account balance –
Real credit + in principle
REER +
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used early indicator of banking and currency crises is the current ac-
count deficit. Since deficits are associated with crises, the prior for the
current account balance is negative.
This indicator, however, might not be very relevant in the case of
Venezuela, where the current account is generally in surplus because
of the country’s large oil exports. The seventh macro-financial vari-
able included is the real growth of bank credit to the private sector
(REAL CREDIT). A rapid increase (which generally occurs with finan-
cial liberalization) should, in principle, raise the probability of failure
although the opposite is found in a number of studies with bank spe-
cific data. This very much depends on the number of lags taken since
the credit to the private sector appears to decelerate before a banking
crisis or prior to the failure of a particular bank. The eight macro-
financial variable, real exchange rate movements (REER), is also asso-
ciated with currency and banking crises. A real appreciation has a
positive prior. Finally, the change in the consumer price index (INFLA-
TION) appears to increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. On the
other hand, inflation is also a source of revenues for banks, thanks to
the profitable float it generates.
VI. Results
On the basis of the above described methodology, we now test empiri-
cally the relevance of the bank-specific and macro-financial variables
in determining the likelihood of bank failures during the Venezuelan
crisis.
The first step is the calculation of the hazard rate, on the basis of
the number of banks which were at risk in each period. Starting with
a sample of 44 banks in the second quarter of 1992, all of them were at
risk until the first bank failed in the first quarter of 1994. In that
period, the number of banks at risk decreased to 43 (see Figures 1 and
2 for the number of banks failed and those at risk).
The life table method only requires that the number of banks failed
be divided by those still at risk to obtain the hazard rate. Figure 3
shows the evolution of the hazard rate. It is interesting to note that,
because the number of banks at risk diminishes steadily, 10 it is pos-
10 This is due to the fact that no new banks entered the Venezuelan banking system during
the crisis so the number of banks in the banking system decreased exactly by the number of
banks that failed.92 García Herrero: Determinants of the Venezuelan Banking Crisis














































































































































































































































sible for the hazard function to increase even when the number of
failing banks falls. This is what happened in the third and fourth quar-
ters of 1995. The highest hazard ratio was in the second quarter of
1994, which coincides with the peak of the crisis.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 93
As a second step, the statistical properties of the regressors are
analyzed as well as the correlation between them. The number of ob-
servations is in many instances the maximum possible given the number
of existing banks during our sample (519). However, there are some
missing observations for a few variables, as shown in Table A.2 in the
Appendix. In addition, several of the bank-specific ratios are extremely
large, with no economic sense. This is particularly the case for very small
banks. Instead of dropping these potential outliers, they are capped to
a maximum value so as to maintain enough degrees of freedom.
The correlation among regressors is generally low except for very
similar ratios such as NPLs/LOANS and NPLs/CAPITAL (where it reaches
0.70). This is one of the reasons, other than the small number of obser-
vations, not to include all variables in a benchmark equation, as would
be expected in a general to specific approach. The correlation between
the regressors and the dependent variable (FAIL) generally has the
expected sign, except for the variables proxing management compe-
tence and a number of macroeconomic variables (CURRENT ACCOUNT,
REER, REAL CREDIT and INFLATION). In any case, these are only bivari-
ate correlations from which non firm conclusions can be drawn.
A set of figures in Appendix 3 depicts the evolution of macroeco-
nomic variables together with the hazard rate. Real GDP growth, but
also real money growth and real bank credit to the private sector,













































































































394 García Herrero: Determinants of the Venezuelan Banking Crisis
show a rather similar trend to the hazard rate. This is less so for the
real interest rate particularly since it does not increase before the peak
of the hazard rate in the second quarter of 1994. The other variables
seem quite unrelated.
To assess the explanatory power of the above described regres-
sors, a large set of different model specifications is run. Although we
would have preferred a general-to-specific approach, we follow the
opposite one due to the very small number of observations at our dis-
posal.
As a first step, in order to avoid collinearity and to have as many
original observations and degrees of freedom as possible, bi-variate
logit regressions (i.e, only one variable explaining bank failure) are
run. It should be acknowledged, though, that there may be a problem
of misspecification in these regressions when relevant variables are
omitted. Still, it is useful as a exploratory tool to identify –with the
previously mentioned caveat– the potentially more relevant variables
to include in the final regression.
Several variables are found significant in explaining the probabil-
ity of bank failure alone, and with the expected sign (see Table A.4 in
Appendix 3). As regards capital adequacy, the positive coefficient of
OTHER ASSETS indicates that a large share of very illiquid and non
productive assets increases the likelihood of bank failure. As for asset
quality, both NPLs/LOANs and NPLs/CAPITAL increase the probability of
bank failure. Concerning profitability, a high NET INTEREST MARGIN
reduces the likelihood of bank failure. The same is true for VERY LIQ-
UID ASSETS, albeit at a lower confidence level (10%). As regards the
macroeconomic factors, high REAL GDP GROWTH reduces the probabil-
ity of failure. The opposite is true for a high REAL DEPOSIT RATE, but at
a lower confidence level (10%). It is interesting to note that the lax
monetary policy which the CVB conducted prior and during the crisis
does not appear to have helped reduce the likelihood of bank failure,
as shown by the insignificant coefficient of REALM2.
As a second step, two explanatory variables are now included as
regressors in the logit model. Only those variables found significant
in the bi-variate exercise are reported in Table A.5 in Appendix 3.
They all have the expected sign. The variables which are clearly more
significant are, from the bank side, asset quality (NPLs/LOANS and NPLs/
CAPITAL) and profitability measures (NET INTEREST MARGIN). The only
relevant measure of capital adequacy found in the bi-variate regres-
sions (OTHER ASSETS) is significant if combined with macroeconomiceconomía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 95
variables and, to a lesser extent, with bank liquidity (measured by
VERY LIQUID ASSETS). In the same way, bank liquidity adequacy (VERY
LIQUID ASSETS) is only significant when combined with REAL GDP. As
for the macroeconomic variables, REAL GDP is significant in all cases
while the REAL DEPOSITE RATE is only significant when combined with
REAL GDP but not with other variables.
As a third step, the same exercise is conducted with three regres-
sors, with the caveat that the number of observations and degrees of
freedom tends to be reduced. The results (Table A.6 in Appendix 3)
show that the NET INTEREST MARGIN and REAL GDP GROWTH continue
to be significant in virtually all specifications. OTHER ASSETS, NPLs/
LOANS and the REAL DEPOSIT RATE maintain their explanatory power
in some specifications. Bank liquidity adequacy (VERY LIQUID ASSETS)
is the least robust. Finally, the same exercise is conducted with four
regressors and very similar results are obtained (Table A.7 in Appen-
dix 3).
On the basis of these preliminary results, we conduct a set of re-
gressions in which we include all the variables which were found sig-
nificant in the bi-variety regressions. This exercise has the caveat of
the small number of observations and degrees of freedom, which will
be tackled later in a robustness test. For the time being, only original
observations are included for each variable, which reduces the sample
to 320 observations (Table 4, first column from the left). Even in this
case, the NET INTEREST MARGIN and REAL GDP GROWTH are highly sig-
nificant in explaining the likelihood of failure, with the expected nega-
tive sign. To increase the number of observations to the maximum pos-
sible (519), extrapolation is used and missing observations are filled
with the median of each variable. The results continue to hold (Table 4,
second column from the left).
In a second robustness exercise, we include an additional regres-
sor so as to have one for each of the aspects of CAMEL. The missing one
was management capacity since neither of two proxies had been found
significant in the bi-variety regressions. Each of them is added sepa-
rately in the model and extrapolation is used again to fill missing
observations. As before, neither of the two indicators of management
competence is found significant (Table 4, third column from the left
shows the results with one of them, FINANCIAL EXPENSES). The NET
INTEREST MARGIN and REAL GDP are significant in this specification as
well. The last robustness exercise reduces the time span covered in
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in which at least one bank failed are included (namely from the first
quarter of 1994 to the fourth of 1995). This drastically reduces the
number of observations (242) even when filling missing observations
through extrapolation. The NET INTEREST MARGIN continues to be sig-
nificant in this case although the result should be taken with care due
to the few observations.
In order to assess the predictability of bank failures on the basis
of the two main determinants only, GDP growth and bank profitability,
the hazard rate calculated above is compared with the one obtained
with these two variables. As can be seen in the Figure 4, the model
(with GDP growth and net interest margin) would have predicted a
number of bank failures before they actually happened and a fewer num-
ber of failures at the peak of the crisis in the fourth quarter of 1993.
The predictive power is relatively good in the quarters thereafter ex-
cept for the second quarter of 1994.
The results are compared with those of the other available study
for the Venezuelan banking system (Arreaza et al., 2002) even if the
latter on the recent years and not the crisis period. High profitability,
liquidity and economic growth are relevant early indicators in their
study as well. High real interest rates on deposits are also found to be
a useful early warning. Bank management indicators, the monetary
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policy stance, the growth in bank credit and the current account are
irrelevant in both studies. Capital adequacy, not significant in this
study, has the opposite sign in Arreaza et al. (2002). The main differ-
ence lies on the real exchange rate appreciation, which is highly sig-
nificant in their case but does not seem to be a relevant early warning
indicator in my sample period. This is probably related to the strong
capital controls which were introduced during the crisis period.
In more general terms, one may wonder why some of the poten-
tially relevant indicators are not found significant. This is probably
more the case for the capital adequacy ratios since they are at the
heart of a bank’s solvency. From the review of the literature (Section I)
it seems quite common that capital adequacy indicators are not found
significant or even worse than that, they are significant with the op-
posite sign than expected. One of the explanations usually offered for
these weak results relates to the systemic differences that may be
found between small and large banks, concealing differences between
problem and non-problem banks of the same size (Berg and Hexeberg,
1994). In this case, the small size of the sample does not allow us to
eliminate the largest and smallest banks as a robustness exercise.
Also adding a variable, such as total assets or liabilities, was not a
solution because of collinearity problems. In any event, in the case of
Venezuela, the size of the banks is unlikely to be a reason for the weak
explanatory variables of some bank-specific indicators, particularly
solvency ones, since banks of all sizes (large, medium and small) were
affected by the crisis. The explanation may rather lie on the poor en-
forcement capacity of the Venezuelan Superintendency at the time of
the crisis, which allowed the banks to report solvency ratios not reflec-
ting the true state of the bank or even to improve cosmetically their
capital position by selling assets on which they had capital gains while
deferring the sales of assets on which they had capital losses. As for the
lack of significance of the bank management capacity, it is in line with
the findings on the literature which use bank efficiency as a proxy. In
addition, its significance could have been swamped by macroeconomic
factors, such as real GDP growth, as has been the case in other studies.
Finally, the monetary policy stance does not seem to have had an
impact on the probability of bank failure, contrary to what many ana-
lysts in Venezuela argued at the time of crisis. High real deposit rates
did increase the likelihood of bank failure in some model specifica-
tions, which could be interpreted, at first sight, as a restrictive mon-
etary policy. However, real lending rates were not found significant,economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 99
not even the real growth of broad money, a more direct indicator of the
monetary policy stance. The strong significance of the poor profitabil-
ity hints to the possibility that real deposit rates were kept too high,
shrinking thereby the net interest margin, in order to attract deposi-
tors due to the falling confidence in the banking system.
VII. Conclusions
This paper uses discrete event history analysis to test empirically the
significance of several macro-economic and bank-specific variables for
the bank failures that occurred during the Venezuelan banking crisis
of the mid-1990s.
There are two highly significant indicators across the several model
specifications that have been conducted. The first is a bank-specific
variable, the net interest margin, which is usually considered the best
proxy for bank profitability. The second is a macroeconomic variable,
real GDP growth. Both a high net interest margin and real GDP growth
appear to reduce the likelihood of bank failure. With the benefit of
hindsight, these two could have been useful early warning indicators
in the run-up to the crisis. This does not mean, however, that they
could be useful indicators of bank failures in future banking crises in
Venezuela since the sample taken is short and only includes one crisis
event.
There are other, less robust, determinants of bank failure, such as
the share of the most illiquid and nonproductive assets to own funds,
as a measure of capital adequacy, the share of non-performing loans,
proxing asset quality, and the share of very liquid assets, measuring
bank liquidity, all with the expected sign. In addition, another macro-
economic variable, the real deposit rate, was found to increase the
likelihood of bank failure in some model specifications. The latter
should not be interpreted as the monetary policy stance being too re-
strictive for bank soundness since the lending deposit rate and, par-
ticularly, the real growth of broad money –a more direct indicator of
the monetary policy stance– was not found significant. In turn, the
strong significance of the poor profitability hints to the possibility that
real deposit rates were kept too high, shrinking thereby the net interest
margin, to attract depositors in view of the lack of confidence in the
banking system. It is important to point out that these determinants
are, not only less robust, but also subject to potential misspecification100 García Herrero: Determinants of the Venezuelan Banking Crisis
because they stem from bi-variate, and sometimes three- and four-
variate models with potential missing variables. In addition, the fact
that no measure of bank efficiency is found significant is another ca-
veat of the analysis, mainly related to the lack of data on the quality
of the bank administration.
In sum, these results show that bank profitability and real eco-
nomic growth could have been useful early warning indicators of the
Venezuelan banking crisis. The use of a simple method, such as the one em-
ployed in this paper (discrete event history analysis), would have fa-
cilitated updating the relevant information regularly to recalculate
the likelihood of bank failure. In turn, public information on bank
solvency (particularly the ratio of own funds to total assets) does not
seem to have been good enough to allow depositors to distinguish be-
tween solvent and insolvent banks. This is not too strange given the
poor enforcement capacity of SUDENBAN at the time of the crisis.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 101
Appendix 1. Data Details
Table A.1. Variable Definition and Source
Bank specific Venezuelan Superintendency of Banks (SUNDEBAN)
Capital adequacy
Capital Capital and reserves to (unweighted) total assets
Productive assets Productive assets (i.e., liquid ones) to total assets
Non-productive assets Share of non-productive assets (i.e., the most
illiquid ones) to capital and reserve
Other assets Other assets (the least liquid ones) to capital and
reserves
Asset quality
NPLs/loans Non-performing loans to total loans
NPLs/capital Non-performing loans to capital and reserves
Provisioning Share of provisioned loans over gross NPLs
Profitability
Net interest margin
Financial expenses Financial expenses to the average cost of funding
Management
Structural expenses Expenses related to the normal business
(financial, administrative and headcount)
to average assets
Operational expenses Operational expenses (financial and
administrative to average cost of funding)
Liquidity Share of very liquid assets to total assets
Very liquid assets Very liquid assets in domestic and foreign
currency to total deposits
Macro-financial IFS and Central Bank of Venezuela
REAL GDP Interanual GDP growth rate in real terms
REAL M2 Interanual growth rare of broad money, in real
terms
Real lending rate Average lending rate offered by banks
Real deposit rate Average deposit rate offered by banks
Spread Difference between deposit rate and lending rate
Current account Current account as a percentage of GDP
Real credit Interanual growth rate of bank credit to the
private sector, in real terms
REER Real effective exchange rate
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Figure A.1. Real GDP Growth
Figure A.2. Real Money Growth
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Figure A.3. Real Interest Rates
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Figure A.5. Current Account Balance (percent of GDP)
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90 Estimated hazard rate
(left scale)
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Appendix 3. Additional Results
Table A.4. Single Variable Regressions




























Note: A minus (plus) sign shows that the variable significantly reduces (increases) the
likelihood of failure (or lengthens the time a bank remains open).
** Indicates significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 109
Table A.5. Bi-variate Regressions
Other assets +* NPLs/capital +**
Other assets NPLs/loans + **
Other assets Net interest margin –**
Other assets +* Very liquid assets
Other assets + ** Real GDP –**
Other assets + ** Real deposit rate +*
NPLs/loans +* Net interest margin –**
NPLs/loans + ** Very liquid assets
NPLs/loans Real GDP –**
NPLs/loans + ** Real deposit rate
NPLs/capital + ** Net interest margin –**
NPLs/capital + ** Very liquid assets
NPLs/capital + ** Real GDP –**
NPLs/capital + ** Real deposit rate
Net interest margin –* Very liquid assets
Net interest margin –** Real GDP –**
Net interest margin –** Real deposit rate
Very liquid assets Real GDP – **
Very liquid assets Real deposit rate
Real GDP –** Real deposit rate + **
Note: A minus (plus) sign shows that the variable significantly reduces (increases) the
likelihood of failure (or lengthens the time a bank remains open).
** Indicates significance at the 10% level.
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